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The Degradation of Land and the Position of Poetry 
Martin Harrison 
“Words are not meanings for a tree....”  
       Judith Wright 
There could be a very long version of this essay, but this will have to 
be the short version. Occasionally, there will be far too obvious indications 
of where a much longer, more argued version ought to take over. This ver-
sion is a short cut. This last remark has to be said with a certain un-
abashedness because, really, a short cut is something impossible in such a 
large terrain. The questions I am asking are ones provoked by the almost 
automatic connection made between poetry and ecological issues, matters 
to do with the poem and matters of the environment and nature. Is there in 
fact any reason to make such a connection? Does poetry have any part in 
the current array of activities necessary to maintain the environment in the 
face of the new millennium’s pressures of urbanism, of technology, of pov-
erty, of capitalism and population growth? Anyway, how much contempo-
rary Australian poetry is ecological?  
A Note from Mindi Station  
Mostly I want to discuss Philip Hodgins’ poem “A Note from Mindi Sta-
tion” with its immediately provocative opening line about the spaciousness 
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of Australian landscape: “The isolation seemed so reasonable.”1 Yet before 
saying anything more about the poem, one further aspect of the short cut 
must be mentioned straight away: there seems to me to be a difference (I 
derive a sense of this difference, in part, from my own practice) between 
poetry which offers a “picture window” account of the environment and one 
which offers a level of immersedness and provisionality in relation to the 
environment.2 My “picture window” characterisation is not unlike the Ameri-
can critic, Charles Altieri’s famous 1984 critique of what he termed the 
“scenic mode,” a mode which he traced in much late 20th Century poetry. 
For Altieri, the scenic mode is excessively resorted to in poetry which con-
nects with landscape. For Altieri, the “scenic mode” is a repetitive poetic 
gesture – mainly derived from the ongoing influence of Romantic poetry – 
by which a poet isolates or snaps off a moment in nature (a scene) and 
then, in the poem, identifies the make up of that scene as part of the poet’s 
own psyche or mood within some or other version of a privileged moment 
of structured insight.3 The “picture window” poem is like this: only, as the 
reference to an architectonics of viewing might suggest, it is pivoted around 
a conscious act of seeing, of identifying and naming. Altieri argues that the 
problem with the scenic mode starts with the issue of the poet’s over-
whelming centrality to the poem, a suffocating Romantic egoism which, ar-
guably, lingers more in the American tradition than it does in the Australian. 
For me, however, the emphasis on an architecture of sight and seeing 
marks a genuine cultural divide between Australian and American poetry. 
Recent Australian poetry often stresses the newness of how a supposedly 
“strange” desertic or arid landscape is describable, or draws attention to the 
relative newness of typically Australian senses of placement. The issue, in 
other words, is less about the ego – the presence of the democratic self 
amid the landscape – than about cultural perception and, arguably, cultural 
originality. This difference in sensibility is usually expressed in a deeply 
conscious attention to the visual behaviour of things or the visual images of 
humans in landscape.  
This emphasis on visual form is one of the ways in which Philip Hodg-
ins' poem “A Note from Mindi Station” – a poem so concerned with how the 
poet views an arid landscape – is of particular interest. Via the picture win-
dow Hodgins is able to look on with great patience and sensitivity. He even, 
for instance, “sees” the difference between focus and blur. Quickly filling us 
in on the scattered layout of buildings on a large property he talks of how: 
…the North Cottage has been a base, 
a kind of focus in this blur of scrub. 
It’s near a dried-up section of the creek 
about five miles from where the homestead is.4
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Thus, if the settled placement of a dwelling place is in focus, its surrounds 
are not: thus, the cottage works indeed as “a kind of focus in this blur of 
scrub.” Similarly the final stanzas of the poem derive much from the con-
trast between panoramic and then close-up photography techniques and 
the manipulation of focus in foreground and background. A reader needs to 
get an overall sense of the visual dynamics of the poem in order to under-
stand this feature fully. For the poem moves (via a conversation with a 
young woman delivering supplies from the homestead) through a series of 
different takes which shift from surround senses into a vertical construction 
of space:  
She says she loves to watch the tiny jets 
adhering to their flight-path eight miles up 
and wonder where they might be headed for. 
By straining you can just make out their shape 
but nothing of the isolated roar.  
They’re silent as a particle of dust.  
 
Today a sparrow hawk was hovering there. 
Its legs had been let down with claws outstretched, 
the wings had worked themselves into a blur, 
the head was changing settings like a switch; 
but what was fixed in place was one small bird, 
which might have been the pivot of the world.5
Such reflectiveness about the architectonics of the view also includes, it 
seems to me, an awareness of the newness of how “we” (i.e. the sort of 
people who set up bases, have radios, dream of aeroplanes etc) construct 
our seeing of Australia. At the very least, “A Note from Mindi Station” invites 
the reader to acknowledge a degree of extremity in which we look at the 
harshness of landscape. It is woven with sparse but very telling details of 
this extremity – the “strangely ferrous” colour of the soil, the days of slow 
four wheel driving to get there, the dried up creek. Hodgins’ poem mani-
fests a fully self-aware visual acuity. It is, besides, a poem which plays to 
such a degree on the “seeming” nature of the reasonableness of being so 
far away from a town ("the isolation seemed so reasonable") that any 
reader will immediately suspect that really it is a poem to do with the “un-
reasonableness” of the isolation he describes out at Mindi, south of the 
Hammersley Ranges: in short, every gesture of being there is surrounded 
by an intense, watchful sense of the presence of landscape, of the horizon 
and visual depth. This is somewhere where the hugeness of the sky lacks a 
name and where implications to be drawn from that realisation are not 
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clear. It's a place where jet planes are “tiny” and hard to make out in the 
sky's intense glitter. Such pictorial or photographic isolatedness brings with 
it a self conscious intellectual and psychological edge, or frame, which both 
marks the uniqueness of the moment and, at the same time, suggests a 
“something else” which cannot be developed or named.  
Here, however, are some other characteristics of the picture window. 
Firstly, the viewpoint in the poem is entirely ballistic: it is to do with straight 
lines drawn across space, in which target areas (the cottage, the sparrow 
hawk) are in focus and others not. Even the woman seems to stand in front 
of us, as if in the hairline of a rifle’s eyepiece or in a camera lens. The 
poem sets up, in other words, a geometrically constructed cinema scene. A 
second characteristic, closely connected to the first, is the non-negotiable 
distance between speaker and the things (a woman, a place) observed: it is 
not that nothing happens to motivate that sense of space, nor that there is 
no sense of “event,” but that the relationship between the speaker and the 
things going on is oddly stabilised. The same distance is maintained 
throughout, much like a contour-copy made by a pantograph – that me-
chanical device which allows you to trace contours and diagrams exactly 
and which maintains an unchanging distance between the pointer which 
traces on one piece of paper and the pencil which draws on another. The 
distance is, so to speak, a fixed distance which an entire discourse struc-
ture can take up in a transparent, untroubled way: illusionistically, the poem 
offers a correspondingly “entire” and unwavering state of mind. (Again the 
“seeming” reasonableness mentioned in the poem's opening line is closely 
suggested here.) Further, there is a third characteristic deeply implicated in 
the way the poem proceeds as a discursive structure – namely that the im-
ages of the poem are seamlessly folded into it. Whether we consider the 
visual references – the dried up creek, the ferrous colours – or the similes 
(silence like a particle of dust, the bird's head-movements like a switch), 
these are not disjunctive, shock-filled images. Each image contributes to 
the singular direction of meaning and intention which the discourse carries. 
Image is, in other words, absorbed by thought; vision leads back to dis-
course, so that ultimately nothing extraneous or vagabond can disrupt the 
carefully formalised play-off between thought and emptiness, between 
viewpoint and non-reason.  
Hodgins’s finely honed poem is in many ways the straw man of this 
essay. It comes from someone who had a deeply knowledgeable relation-
ship with country. It is a finely managed piece of writing. But to speak 
frankly, there is also something disturbing (and even irritating) in the way 
the poem formalises the relationship between speech and space: it's that 
descriptiveness, I suppose, and the care with which the place is so well 
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“captured” in images which immaculately feed back into thought-structure. 
For a fourth characteristic of the poem is the way in which the poem’s inci-
dental narrative is, unquestioningly, wholly in the domain of the speaker’s 
project: the result is that the place is offered in an ideal fashion, without 
equivocation, without a sense of searching for how to account for it – and 
only from the vantage point of the speaker. Even the woman’s observations 
are blended in, and taken over, by the speaker. Epistemologically, in other 
words, Mindi is a place where (to borrow a phrase from the philosopher 
Charles Taylor writing about Heidegger) the understanding of reality is dis-
posed principally “through the power of a subject.”6 There is very little to 
suggest that subjective awareness is operating other than in control of the 
place. There is no skepticism as to whether or not the real is what can be 
represented by that subject. 
Immersion  
"A Note from Mindi Station” is poetry closely identified with land and 
country. It is by a poet whose work often reckons elegantly with land, with 
working on land, with the nature of technology and the impact of techno-
logical visions of country. It is one of the pieces in which Hodgins uses a 
formulation I much admire – his notion of “landspeak” (“strong ancient 
landspeak on the radio”): 
The isolation seemed so reasonable: 
three days of stasis on a broken track 
with big cogs grinding in low ratio, 
a survey map to make it possible, 
strong ancient land-speak on the radio 
and unexpected camels staring back.7
The concept of lands-speak and the tone of the line it occurs in are very 
Hodgins.  
If you read a number of Australian poets, especially those publishing 
towards the end of the last century as was the late Philip Hodgins, it is hard 
not to be surprised how often the originality of recent Australian poetry is in 
part to do with what I have elsewhere termed a kind of subjunctiveness, a 
conditionality, in relation to European-derived terms land, landscape and 
countryside.8 To be in an Australian place and to “see” it brings a number 
of conditions, a number of reflexive and reflective moments of awareness. 
Here, again, there is the risk of offering only a “short cut” version of this 
statement about a conditional mode, since obviously the category is com-
plex. But one fairly obvious way of thinking about conditionality is to think 
Martin Harrison    ░ 130 
about it in cultural or bi-cultural terms: namely that, given the recentness of 
European settlement in Australia, a sense of how European structures, 
land forms and land uses have been imposed on the country is relevant, 
living and thinkable. It is possible, for instance, to become conscious of 
how someone may “see” country in an exclusive, imperialistic way. It be-
comes possible, too, to understand how, if you overlook or refuse a sense 
of a multi-sided construction of Indigenous and westernised vision, then 
you suffer a kind of amnesia in relation to the past. But worse, you suffer 
too what might be termed amnesia towards present time: in other words, 
certain things simply do not come into vision. These might range from is-
sues to do with the use of land, its re-shaping and sculpting, through to a 
sense of the multiplicity of names which places have historically and a 
reckoning with the recentness of European nominalisation. Or it might be to 
do with an awareness of how many traces of Indigenous settlement are still 
visible when looking out, say, across a hill side. Indeed, this sort of many 
sided “viewing” may invoke even an understanding of the different forms of 
custodianship, care and ownership which country is subject to.9  
To envisage this conditionality as primarily bi-cultural teases out the 
concept but at the same time risks reducing it to history and politics in a 
way which, unintentionally, effaces the real memories of real people. For 
many less obviously intercultural ways of seeing offer a kind of condition-
ality – such as how movement, colour, senses of dimension, or an intuitive 
reckoning with the relations of the built and unbuilt environment, can work 
together to suggest a totality or a sense of deep relatedness between these 
elements. These factors when drawn into the imaginative texture of a piece 
of writing – a poem or a fiction – start to bring into play a sense of the ap-
propriateness and inappropriateness of some metaphors of sight, listening 
and atmosphere over others. There are conditions, in other words, by 
which we can accurately account for our seeing, for how the world looks to 
us. This subjunctive state requires that a particular style of sensing and 
feeling is invented, one cognizant of the given limits of a singular vantage 
point in time and space. Put another way, there is a series of phenomenol-
ogical subject-object relations available here which are not just part of the 
observer’s social or psychological context but are part of the phenomenol-
ogical settings of the things themselves. Equally, there are deeply historical 
requirements in the inherited texture of language and sensation (especially 
some of the earlier mentioned issues which cohere around memories of 
settlement, or around direct, personal experiences of country and around 
perceptions of the environment) which not only oblige poetry to acquire a 
phenomenological fullness but which open up ways to do so. A number of 
Australian poets have responded to this many-sided sense of the environ-
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ment, including very notable examples like Jennifer Rankin or the later Tao-
ist-influenced work of David Campbell. Contemporarily I can think of exam-
ples such as John Jenkins’s precise, almost botanical observational po-
ems, or recent poems by Louise Crisp. The most outstanding example re-
mains, however, Judith Wright's poetry, with its re-iterations of the multiple 
sense of local vision and her persistent, at times ecstatic awareness of both 
the limits and the necessary centrality of language in the formation of per-
ception.  
At heart, an awareness of the controlling position of the subject has to 
address how consciousness constructs the world and is constructed 
through it, and particularly in relation to the medium in which, as poets, we 
constitute our sense of the world – namely language. To go back to Tay-
lor’s phrase, the disposition of an understanding of reality which has the 
speaker or the he or she who utters at the centre of language is one which 
will not acknowledge the problem of an absence of authentic being in a 
highly technologised world, or the breakdown of an ontologically founded 
relationship between human consciousness and things and the abyssal 
problem of how to construct meaning, how to be meaningful. These, as 
Australia’s greatest environmental poet, Judith Wright, repeatedly said, are 
centrally problems to do with language and how knowledge is constructed.  
Her thoughts about poetry consistently reflected this concern to step 
over the position of the subject and a reductive form of subjectivity. To 
some degree this awareness of the reductive, narrowing nature of human 
presence is the meaning of her term “wisdom” in a poem like “Gum-Trees 
Stripping”: wisdom, here, is a deeply attuned and observant “quietness” in 
which human reason does not look ''for reasons past the edge of reason.”10 
On the other hand, this very same sense of provisionality is what obliges an 
understanding, not without its own tragic dimension, that it is language 
which makes the place for significant experience. It is, to quote from the 
poem “Nameless Flower”, the poet's ability to set “a word upon a word” 
which allows for evanescent, nameless events and things – in this case, a 
botanically unidentified white flower – to become meaningful: 
Flakes that drop at the flight of a bird 
and have no name, 
I'll set a word upon a word 
to be your home.11
Many of her best poems are, like “Nameless Flower”, deeply intimate, yet 
at the same time seem to proceed from a place in the mind which is not 
subjective and, indeed, is even impersonal. Experience goes hand in hand 
with the way that this seemingly impersonal requirement – a requirement 
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borne by language and by an awareness of the limited place of human con-
sciousness in the wider world – is handled and brought to fruition. Such 
understanding is not a matter of intention but of immersion.  
We know, too, from her own account, of the extent of her engagement 
with aspects of her husband Jack McKinney’s work in philosophy and the 
history of science – for example, the impact on both of them of the then 
new concepts of immeasurability (such as Heisenberg’s theories and other 
areas of quantum physics). Both McKinney and Wright are equally con-
cerned about how such scientific theories challenge the notion of experi-
ence and set up paradoxical conditions for intuition and reason. The con-
gruence of this with Heidegger’s work at the same time – he is also re-
sponding to Heisenberg’s physics, no less than to Heisenberg’s writings on 
language – are striking.12 For our purposes, what is clear is that Judith 
Wright was thinking about the relation between human experience and the 
technologisation of nature through most of her life. Within her evolving phi-
losophy of the environment and nature, there is inevitably a comparable 
read-through, so to speak, to her views on subjecthood. Thus, for instance, 
when, in her memoir Half a Lifetime, she starts to think about the signifi-
cance or lack of significance of the personal memories on which a life story 
is founded, she starts to muse on subatomic particles which are, as she 
puts it, “shot through with cosmic relationships”. Selfhood too cannot be 
seen as unified and measurable. “‘I,’” she goes on to write, “is a shimmer-
ing multiple and multitude, it seems.”13 This is an extraordinary and im-
mensely interesting version of what I term “provisionality.”  
Land and Poetry 
References to Heidegger have hovered behind this essay. Not uncon-
nected with the broad theme of language and land, Charles Taylor and 
others such as Robert Zimmerman wanted some years ago to argue for a 
link between the sort of consciousness theory at work in Heideggerian lan-
guage theory and many of the concerns of so-called “deep” ecology.14  
For the moment it may suffice to say that, given Heidegger’s focus on 
how systemic elements of consciousness construct meaning and how hu-
man participation in meaning-making is motivated by response, by atten-
tiveness and by self-conscious reflection on a dimensional awareness of 
things and their settings, Heidegger offers, in my view, an ecological, or a 
proto-ecological, language theory. For Heidegger, “we hear what language 
says only because we belong within it.”15 In the well known essay “Lan-
guage” (“Die Sprache”) Heidegger offers not a refutation of structuralist or 
grammatical theorisations of language but rather an attempt to refound the 
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study of language within a hermeneutic account of the intertwined relation-
ship between utterance and being – in particular a way to move the 
speaker (the subject and the subjective domain of discourse) to one side of 
language and away from a central controlling role. While Heidegger warns 
of the dangers of taking his acoustic metaphors too literally, the phraseol-
ogy of calling and response, the modelling of meaning on the displacing 
and mobile behaviour of wave-effects (sound waves, for instance) and the 
intense meditation on the category of stillness (both inertia and silence) are 
all means of redefining where the “I” or the subject speaks from. The “I” 
speaks from a displaced, moving and partly unconscious relationship with 
meaning. Indeed it might be true to say that, in his concern for realising the 
highly ambiguous way in which utterance engages both with the presence 
and absence of being, Heidegger is trying to let into language a role for the 
pre-linguistic and unconscious way in which meanings are evoked in 
speech. In every regard, human attentiveness focusses not on words but 
on things and on their meanings and voicings in human consciousness. 
Such an intertwining of things and consciousness is not only best under-
stood as a feature of poetic language, it provokes in human consciousness 
a deeply structured, never fully resolved interplay between intimate senses 
of environing things and no less compelling senses of differentiation and 
objectification.16 It is founded in short on the insight which the epigraph 
from Judith Wright which starts this essay offers: “Words are not meanings 
for a tree.”17  
Likewise, we can find, in the contemporary context, other not entirely 
dissimilar de-centring and potentially ecological accounts of subject rela-
tions in regard to the constitutive function of language: for example, cogni-
tive theories of language, especially those which focus on the deeply im-
planted nature of metaphor in concept formation. Here, as Lakoff and 
Johnson have pointed out, there is no ideal point of removal from immer-
sion in already emerging meaning and experience: there is no glass wall 
from behind which to view the world. “Metaphorical thought is,” as they put 
it, “normal, not deviant.”18 Metaphors are like deeply structured morphemic 
elements in discourse which inevitably engage with the sensory and physi-
cal constructions of human experience. Far from being a deviation from 
correct theorisation, they are the pre-requisite of theory. Meaning, similarly, 
cannot be dissociated from a context of embodied and environing experi-
ences, whether to do with the specific cognitive structures which construct 
both overt and autonomic consciousness or to do with the construction of 
space and location which, more broadly, are part of human modalities to do 
with the senses.  
For Lakoff and Johnson, the embodiment of meaning “locates mean-
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ing in the body and in the unconscious conceptual system” of the body’s 
own reflexive structure. For them: 
(o)ur brains and minds do not operate using abstract formal symbols 
which are given meaning by correlations to an allegedly mind-
independent world that comes with categories and essences built in. 
The body and mind are where meanings arise in and through our in-
teractions with the environment and other people.19  
Thus, language and thinking are (biologically) part of a two-way bio-
feedback process between mind and thing: they are implanted in the con-
ceptual and sensory mapping which we call being-in-the-world.20 Nor are 
the environmental implications of recognising “meaning” as (in my terms) a 
located, immersive modality overlooked. “The environment,” they write, “is 
not an ‘other’ to us. It is not a collection of things that we encounter. Rather, 
it is part of our being...We cannot and do not exist apart from it.”21 Descrip-
tiveness is something, in short, which cannot be separated out from the en-
vironment. Similarly metaphors do not articulate only a space within dis-
course, but articulate the integration of discourse in event-filled, conscious 
space.  
With these thoughts in mind then, it is time to turn back to “A Note 
from Mindi Station.” Philip Hodgins’s poem seems at first sight to come out 
of the tradition of Australian land-centred and landscape poetry. If it has 
been introduced here as something of a straw man for a discussion be-
tween the polarities of landscape on the one hand and ecology on the 
other, that may have disguised the fact that even this poem is not in any 
straightforward sense about landscape – or, arguably, even about a place. 
As with so much of his poetry, we can happily lose our way in the skill with 
which he offers descriptive richness and forget how much his poems are 
about intention, about psychological senses of doing and not-doing: in this 
case, about a deeply structured lack of communication. The lack of infor-
mation (what are “we” doing there, out there?), the failure of the speaker to 
engage in conversation with the woman, the uncanny silence of the pre-
sumably male speaker, the silence which surrounds the sparrow hawk, all 
make the poem intensely memorable. It is as if the poet wishes to silence 
pathos, to silence language in a way which offers no further communica-
tion. It is in many ways a poem about language, about the blockage of ut-
terance.  
There is no intention, then, to argue against the poem in the sense of 
failing to acknowledge its worth or subsuming it into my own ideas about 
language and the environment. The point all along has been to trace the 
connections between poetry which focusses on landscape and a by no 
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means automatically identical set of thoughts about subjectivity and lan-
guage which are inherited through ecological philosophy. Landscape po-
etry, after all, may not be ecological at all. The ecological position of poetry 
is more than just a representational one in which the bare ground, the cot-
tage and the plane’s vapour trail find themselves. This conclusion – in ef-
fect, that the demands of an ecological perception break open the picture 
window and the concept of landscape alike – brings with it two further con-
sequences. Firstly: no matter how well intended, we cannot protect the 
world through more and more irony about our uncomfortable location in it. 
Putting an aesthetic framework around the absence of a connection with a 
fullness and a responsiveness in the environment does not respond to the 
reasons for that absence. Even the way the calculated, symbolic refusal of 
a sense of place blends into a much deeper, more psychological sort of 
denial – this is, in the final analysis, what probably most motivates “A Note 
from Mindi Station” – does not lead through automatically to a re-thinking 
and regrounding of a sustainable, livable place. Such landscapes may be 
no less part of the conscious and unconscious degrading of land at the 
hands of consumerist, late capitalist economies than any other form of 
submersion and conversion of country. For it is not possible to carry 
through a thinking about sustainability without thinking through what has 
emerged in the interfusion of contemporary technologies and contemporary 
scientific understanding and what is still meant by the term “nature.” 
Secondly, the environmental work of poetry in the world is not suffi-
ciently explicable in terms of a psychology or a “sentiment” of place. Of 
course, those who love particular environments and locales do so with 
deep feeling. Sooner or later, as in “Nameless Flower”, the awareness of 
interlinkage between human presence and natural process emerges as an 
understanding of what Wright calls “(b)eing now; being love.”22 Yet, as 
Wright also saw, the link between poetry and land is, ultimately, a technical 
one. It is do with a set of technically parallel relationships: it is about what 
sort of relationship you take up with language – in effect, how you inhabit it. 
If the ego remains imperialistically at the centre of utterance, then the con-
sequences are rational control, a self-defeating sense of irony, an inability 
to deal with non-human meaning. Unlike this way of proceeding, an eco-
logical language lets the poem become a place to work out a relationship 
with meaning: literally, to work out the embodied nature of how being a 
subject inhabits meaning and is part of making meaning. Poetry written in 
the midst of today's ecological crisis, inevitably will have much to do with an 
attentiveness to things and their setting. For poetry is what occurs – it is the 
event – when things come, for themselves, into place.  
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not transcendent, that is, not utterly independent of the body” (ibid., p. 128). At risk 
of reducing poetry to other people’s ideas, some version of this style of conceptu-
alising body-mind-world relationships can be associated with the work of several 
contemporary American poets such as Jorie Graham. Interestingly, too, Graham’s 
middle period poetry references Heidegger explicitly and some recent poems ref-
erence no less embodied systems such as fractal maths. 
19 Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, p. 463. 
20 Charles Taylor glosses Heidegger’s thoughts on the situatedness of human per-
ception within an already constituted world, contrasting it with the “mistakes” of 
Platonic theories of the Idea on the one side and of subjective representationalism 
on the other. Both assume that somehow we control what we see in the world – 
the first, by re-thinking the world as a series of intellectually apprehended Ideas, 
the other by employing subjective awareness as the measure of the world. The 
shared mistake is to assume that we have access to our knowledge of the world in 
a manner which is not “Dasein-related” – namely, from and through the world. 
21 Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, p.566. 
22 Wright, “Nameless Flower,” Collected Poems, p.131. 
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